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ABSTRACT
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a common protocol used in
organizations for Directory Service. LDAP is popular because of its features such as
representation of data objects in hierarchical form, being open source and relying on TCP/IP,
which is necessary for Internet access. However, with LDAP being used in a large number of
web applications, different types of LDAP injection attacks are becoming common. The idea
behind LDAP injection attacks is to take advantage of an application not validating inputs
before being used as part of LDAP queries. An attacker can provide inputs that may result in
alteration of intended LDAP query structure. LDAP injection attacks can lead to various
types of security breaches including (i) Login Bypass, (ii) Information Disclosure, (iii)
Privilege Escalation, and (iv) Information Alteration. Despite many research efforts focused
on traditional SQL Injection attacks, most of the proposed techniques cannot be suitably
applied for mitigating LDAP injection attacks due to syntactic and semantic differences
between LDAP and SQL queries. Many implemented web applications remain vulnerable to
LDAP injection attacks. In particular, there has been little attention for testing web
applications to detect the presence of LDAP query injection attacks.

The aim of this thesis is two folds: First, study various types of LDAP injection attacks and
vulnerabilities reported in the literature. The planned research is to critically examine and
evaluate existing injection mitigation techniques using a set of open source applications
reported to be vulnerable to LDAP query injection attacks. Second, propose an approach to
detect LDAP injection attacks by generating test cases when developing secure web
applications. In particular, the thesis focuses on specifying signatures for detecting LDAP
injection attack types using Object Constraint Language (OCL) and evaluates the proposed
approach using PHP web applications. We also measure the effectiveness of generated test
cases using a metric named Mutation Score.
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CHAPTER 1
Motivation, Problem Statement and Contribution
1.1

Background

LDAP is a protocol used to access and maintain directory services. LDAP uses a client-server
model for accessing directory information. The data required to form the Directory Information
Tree (DIT) is stored in one or multiple LDAP servers [1]. The data models in directories enabled
with LDAP are represented hierarchically to make the information easily accessible. Along with
the hierarchical representation, LDAP also provides a standardized method of local and remote
data access. Local access standards are provided by Relational Database Management Systems
(RDBMS) systems such as SQL. However, remote access standards are usually proprietary.
LDAP provides a method to move data to multiple locations without affecting any external
access to the data. Such features and usability make LDAP unique and popular for its use in
Directory services [2].

Figure 1: Directory tree structure of LDAP server
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Figure 1 shows an example of LDAP directory tree structure. The tree is subdivided into
different Organizational Units (ou) along with common names for each of them (cn). For
example, the organizational unit of Human Resources has common name as HR. Different
entries of each organizational unit are given under the common name such as the employees
working in a particular department and any document relevant to the particular department.
The LDAP is used in a large number of web applications, and therefore, different types of
injection attacks are common. The idea behind LDAP injection [3] attack is to take advantage of
an application’s vulnerability of not validating user inputs properly. A vulnerable application
suffering from LDAP injection attacks can be exploited by providing carefully crafted input data
containing parts of the LDAP query. After including the attacker’s inputs, the intended structure
of LDAP query gets altered. When the altered query is executed, many unwanted activities can
take place leading to security breaches (e.g., login bypass). A vulnerable application cannot
differentiate a malicious query generated based on attacker’s supplied inputs and legitimate
query generated based on benign inputs. LDAP injection attacks, such as Login Bypass, can lead
to various types of security breaches.

There are various possibilities of how LDAP injection attacks can be used to exploit a particular
application. LDAP injection attacks allow attackers to disclose potentially sensitive information
and manipulate certain data in the underlying database. As for example, in a popular event
planner application, Events Planner - SmarterMail 7.x (7.2.3925) [4], LDAP injection
vulnerability has been discovered where input type parameters can be provided to alter a
disjunctive (OR) query to conjunctive (AND) query or vice versa. With this type of injection
technique, an attacker can retrieve sensitive information. In many cases, administrators tend to
configure LDAP server insecurely due to lack of knowledge. Thus, a simple injection technique
could access user information or even change the password of the administrator. Many issues
arise after LDAP being enabled because the applications were not tested with LDAP as the
default protocol [5].

Different types of injection attacks such as SQL injections [6], LDAP injections [3] etc. have
been prevalent among web applications over the last decade. In fact, query injection flaws
13

remain as one to the top ranked security vulnerabilities according to Open Web Application
Security Project (OWASP) report [7]. Among several common query injection attacks, much of
the research efforts have been made to detect and prevent SQL injection attacks [8, 9, 10, 11,
12]. In contrast, LDAP injection attacks have not received enough attention.

1.2

Motivation

LDAP injection attacks take place when an application does not validate user inputs properly.
This vulnerability leads to exploitation of an application by providing carefully crafted data
containing parts of the LDAP query. When the altered query is executed, it leads to different
types of security breaches. Depending on the target application implementation, one could try to
achieve any of the following types of attacks, including Login Bypass, Information Disclosure,
Privilege Escalation, and Information Alteration. The attack types discussed in this Section have
been gathered from the literature and technical reports [7, 13, 14, 15].

In this thesis, we have replicated these attacks with a prototype PHP web application employing
backend LDAP server. Details of each of injection type are given below.

Login Bypass
First, we show an authorized access in Figures 2 and 3.

Correct way
of logging
in.

Figure 2: A snapshot of a web application interface showing authorized access

Figure 3: Resultant page after an authorized login
14

Figure 2 shows the login interface for a web application. The Figure shows an authorized access
by providing the username as pbulusu and password as 123456 which leads to the response page
shown in Figure 3. The search filter becomes
searchlogin = "(&(uid="pbulusu")(password="123456"))";

However, as shown in Figures 4 and 5, an attacker can login to the application bypassing the
need of supplying valid username and password. If the provided username and password values
are not validated before applying them to generate a query intended to perform a search
operation, the query gets altered. An attacker commonly applies valid special characters
supported by the LDAP query engine such as &, |, (, and ).

Figure 4: A snapshot of unauthorized login

The attacker will
be redirected to this
page though the
correct username
and password is not
entered.

Figure 5: Resultant page after an unauthorized login

Figure 4 shows an attempt of login bypass attack where an attacker provides the following string
to bypass the login page [16]. The search filter becomes:
$searchlogin = "(&(uid=*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*)(password="abcdef"))";
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When the application runs this query in the backend LDAP server, it returns all available records
leading to the login for the attacker based on the first available username. Figure 5 shows a
snapshot of the resultant page after the injection attack where the attacker gets access to the
application with the same privilege of first username pbulusu. Note that the inputs supplied at the
user interface are not validated by the server side application, hence leading to this security
breach.
In a search query as stated above, if the username and password values are not checked, one
could alter the dynamic query by inserting particular values. Special characters, such as *, &, |,
(, and ), could be used to alter the final query’s purpose or intention. Though the correct user
name and password may not be provided for a particular user, one can still get an access to the
user account.
Information Disclosure
An attacker could alter a LDAP query thereby modifying it to another LDAP query with more
information. This could be done depending on the internal LDAP query being used by the
application. Figure 6 shows LDAP search operation code.

1. $conn = ldap_connect("servername");
2. $search_string = $_POST[‘search’];
3. $users = ldap_search ($conn,"uid=$search_string");

Figure 6: Code for LDAP search operation

Line 1 shows a user gets connected to the LDAP server. Line 2 shows the search string
($search_string) that the user has entered in a form ( $_POST[‘search’]). Line 3 shows the
search function, ldap_search, used to search for the provided input. An attacker enters * as the
input. Therefore, line 3 becomes $users = ldap_search($conn,"uid=*");
Figure 7 shows the attacker uses only the * symbol instead of a valid user name, and gets access
to the information of all employees in the system (Figure 8).
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Only the "*"
symbol is being
used instead of a
valid user name
in this case.

Figure 7: A snapshot of information disclosure attack

The attacker can
get access to the
entire Directory
since the code is
vulnerable.

Figure 8: The resultant page after information disclosure attack

Privilege Escalation
An attacker could alter a LDAP query modifying it to another query with the intention of gaining
more privilege defined by the security level of the objects. This could be done depending on the
internal LDAP query being used by the application. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate privilege
escalation attack.

Figure 9: A snapshot of privilege escalation attack
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Figure 10: The resultant page after privilege escalation attack

In Figure 1, user klegg and mlevy are listed under ou - HumanResources. Each of them has
different access privileges to various resources. In Figure 9, the user mlevy (attacker) is
providing the user name as klegg(ou=* and the password as *. As a result, user mlevy will be
able to gain access privileges of user klegg (victim). Now, mlevy has access to klegg’s resources
shown in Figure 10.

Information Alteration
LDAP can be used for adding, modifying and deleting information along with search operations.
Different applications that manage directory data in organizations are not necessarily connected
to the directory server. Instead, Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) are used to interact
via LDAP with the information stored in the directory. If the user provides inputs to an
application through a form, an attacker may modify this information to generate an unexpected
result such as modification or deletion of information [14]. Figure 11 shows code for information
alteration.

1. $attr[“cn”] = “klegg”;
2. $dn = “uid=klegg,ou=*”;
3. $result = ldap_modify($ldapconn,$dn, $attr);

Figure 11: Code for information alteration
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In Figure 1, klegg belongs under organizational unit (ou) HumanResources. However, at Line 2,
and distinguished name ($dn) is formed having ou=*. The alteration of ou is invoked by the
method ldap_modify() at Line 3. As a result, klegg now belongs to the other ou (Sales).
Figures 12 and 13 illustrate an example of information alteration type of LDAP injection attack.
In Figure 12, the user sprice of ou Sales Representative who has security level as 'low' accesses
and replaces the Contract Document #2 which belongs to ou Senior Management with the
security level 'high'. In applications which are vulnerable to LDAP injection attacks, an attacker
can replace information successfully as shown in Figure 13.

Figure 12: A snapshot of information alteration attack
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Figure 13: Resultant changes after information alteration attack

1.3

Problem Statement

Protection of LDAP-enabled web applications involves significant effort for the administrators
and developers. Though prevention approaches of LDAP injection attacks are available (e.g.,
administrator and developer techniques), they cannot eliminate LDAP injection attacks
completely. This work is an effort to research and propose a new approach to address LDAP
injection attack types.

During our literature search, we identified a list of common limitations among past research
efforts. These limitations are summarized as follows:


Lack of exhaustive LDAP injection attack type detection coverage. In particular, most
efforts are effective to detect only login bypass attacks. However, they are not suitable for
mitigating privilege escalation attacks that may occur through legitimate login of a user in
vulnerable applications.



Little support to enable developers to securely implement web applications resistant to
LDAP injection attacks. In particular, there is no effort of formally specifying attack
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signatures which should be tested with suitable test inputs for the presence of LDAP
injection vulnerabilities.

Given the obtained literature search results, we define the problem statement for this thesis as
follows:
This research work addresses common limitations found in past research efforts by performing
an in-depth study of LDAP injection attack types, provides an approach to detect the different
types of LDAP injection attacks, and evaluates the proposed approach using PHP web
applications known to be vulnerable to LDAP injection attacks.

1.4

Research Methodology

The research methodology comprised of an intensive literature review of over 40 articles
consisting of information on LDAP injection attacks and mitigation techniques. The research
methodology involves the following activities:
1) Conduct literature search on existing LDAP injection attack types and their prevention
techniques.
2) Study and analyze collected information to understand how LDAP injection attacks are
performed by the attackers and how they are executed at the server side.
3) Develop a prototype web application to replicate selected LDAP injection attacks to
specify the signatures of LDAP injection attacks.
4) Develop a technique to detect LDAP injection attacks based on the identified attack
signatures.
5) Evaluate the proposed detection technique against PHP web applications.

1.5

Contribution

The objectives of this thesis are to conduct an in-depth survey of various types of LDAP
injection attacks; study LDAP injection attacks for various scenarios and understand their
impact; develop a taxonomy of LDAP code injection attacks; select a set of tools to be studied to
compare the suitability of LDAP injection detection; and develop a new technique to overcome
existing limitations and detect LDAP injection attacks.
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The work addresses the stated problem statement by performing the following tasks:

1)

Conduct Literature Search and Develop Web Application
i. Conduct literature survey on existing techniques and methodologies used to prevent
LDAP injection attacks and critically examine the code of existing injection mitigation
techniques.
ii. Compile the literature research results and document the findings for conference
submission.
iii. Develop a web application to replicate selected LDAP injection attacks and to check the
effect it has on the application.

2)

Develop Detection Technique
i. Apply Object Constraint Language-based (OCL) to specify signatures for LDAP
injection attack types. With OCL, we capture the needed pre-conditions, post-conditions,
and invariants that might get affected due to LDAP query injection attacks.
ii. Develop an algorithm to perform fault-injection on OCL constraints (pre-conditions and
post-conditions).

3)

Perform Evaluation and Dissemination
i. Apply and evaluate the proposed technique with a developed PHP web application and
one open source PHP web application reported to have LDAP injection vulnerability.
ii. Disseminate the work results through conference publications.

In the next Chapter, we discuss the literature search findings about the various mitigation
techniques for LDAP injection attacks.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
2.1

Overview

Many research works have been done in the past to prevent LDAP injection attacks [17, 18, 19,
20, 21]. This Chapter presents a literature review of related work on LDAP injection attacks and
highlights common Mitigation Techniques (MTs). This chapter also contrasts SQL Injection and
LDAP Query Injection attacks.

2.2

Mitigation Techniques for LDAP Injection Attacks

Upon literature review of existing mitigation techniques for LDAP query injection attacks, we
classify these techniques into six categories (MT1-MT6) described below.

MT1: Administrator techniques
Password Policy Schema – LDAP has an overlay called Password Policy (ppolicy) to prevent
LDAP injection attacks. The default policy of ppolicy is that the user account gets locked for 24
hours after 10 failed access attempts so as to prevent unauthorized access [13].
LDAP Configuration – This is another approach in which access control is implemented on the
data in the LDAP directory, especially during configuration of permissions on user objects, and
also when the directory is used for single sign-on solution. The access level permitted to the
users can be limited wherein they are not allowed to make any modifications thereby preventing
LDAP injection attacks [13 and 15].
IP Firewall – Access can be restricted by using the IP firewall capability of the server system.
This is either based on the clients' IP address and network interface, or only the network interface
used to communicate with the client. The configuration of IP firewall are dependent on the type
of IP firewall used [22].
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MT2: Developer techniques
Incoming data Validation and Dynamic checks – This is another technique of prevention. All
client supplied data should be thoroughly checked for any kind of malicious input. The best way
of achieving this is to default-deny everything else other than letters and numbers. However, if
symbols need to be used, they should be converted to HTML substitutes before usage [13].
Another prevention technique is to escape special characters. Most of the LDAP injection attacks
are performed using special characters either in the 'Distinguished Name' field or in the 'Search'
filter. Escaping these characters help prevent LDAP injection attacks.
Characters such as &,!,|,=,<,>,,,+,-,",', and ;, should be escaped using \ before being used
in a query; while characters such as (,),\,*,/ and Null used in the Search filter can be escaped
using {\ASCII}, which are given as {\28},{\29},{\5c},{\2a},{\2f} and {\0} respectively. It is a
good practice to include '\\' at the beginning of escaped character listings to prevent recursive
replacements [23].
MT3: Program Transformation technique
The security of a system perimeter can be improved by using security oriented program
transformations by introducing the components of authentication, authorization and input
validation. These three components play a critical role in the security of any system as they form
the basis for prevention of exploitation when applied effectively. When the code is developed for
a particular system, the general approach is to design security from the base level and fix new
vulnerabilities when a security threat is faced. Since it is not feasible to redesign the entire
software whenever a security threat emerges, the vulnerability is fixed only at a certain set of
points. In either way, the vulnerability is not fixed globally. Though the approach of securityoriented program transformations is compared to 'refactoring', it does not preserve the original
behavior of the system; instead, it preserves the expected behavior and responds in accordance
with the attacks.
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The developer plays a key role in specifying the input validation policies as well as parameters
for the program transformation mechanism. Once the input validation policy and the parameters
are known, the implementation of program transformations becomes faster and more reliable.
The input validation task can either be achieved by adding a centralized perimeter filter thereby
eliminating duplication of code or multiple validation policies can be applied to the input
variable by using 'Decorated Filter'. Figure 14 shows how a SQL injection attack could be
eliminated by using 'Decorated Filter'. However, the policies to be applied for the input
validation of SQL and LDAP injection are different; hence the developer can either use a library
of filters or customize it by using parameters.

Figure 14: Elimination of SQL injection attack using 'Decorated Filter' Transformation

In this technique of adding security on demand, when an unsafe input occurs, it is transformed to
a safe input thereby preventing the attack. By using automated tools in this type of rectification
policy, programmers can focus on policies instead of writing and implementing checks, which is
a time consuming task. Program transformations are currently used to eliminate SQL injection
attacks, Log injection attacks, XSS injection attacks, and Direct Static Code injection attacks by

25

implementing policies and removing AND and OR statements. However, they can be similarly
implemented to avoid LDAP injection attacks as well [17 and 18].

MT4: Application Security IDE technique
Application Security IDE (Integrated Development Environment) is an approach that works
similar to spelling and grammar checks in word processor, indicating potential errors while
developing a program thereby allowing developers to fix it and reducing the chances for a
possible future security threat. Moreover, these warnings can also be used at a later stage to
reduce time in software security audits. This particular approach has not been implemented to
prevent LDAP injection attacks primarily. However, the mechanism of 'Interactive Code
Refactoring' is used for 'Input Validation', which is one of the key factors in preventing LDAP
injection attacks [19].

MT5: Remote Code Execution detection technique
Remote Code Execution (RCE) attacks are considered as one of the most prominent security
threats for web applications in the recent times. The attacks caused with the help of RCE are to
such an extent that it is the most widespread PHP Security issue since the mid of 2004 (Open
Web Application Security Project - OWASP). These kind of attacks are similar to Cross Site
Scripting but in a more sophisticated way as they require multiple rounds of communication
between client and server. This approach has been applied to phpMyAdmin and phpLDAPadmin
applications.
Figure 15 shows that a particular type of RCE vulnerability exists in phpLDAPadmin because
malicious code can be provided and executed. The malicious code executes for access control
and allows the attacker to perform privilege escalation. Using RCE detection prevents privilege
escalation injection attacks [21].

26

Figure 15: RCE in phpLDAPadmin v1.2.1.1 (Simplified)

MT6: Static Analysis technique
In this approach, a formal vulnerability signature can be used to detect a possible vulnerability.
Object Constraint Language (OCL) is used to capture vulnerability signatures. Depending on
whether the source of the vulnerability is related to input validation, output validation,
processing or hosting, they are categorized so as to perform static/dynamic analysis. Using a
formal vulnerability analysis definition can be beneficial to perform 'threat analysis' and
'vulnerability analysis' during the development stage as well as 'attack analysis' after deployment
of the project. This can help find possible vulnerabilities and appropriate action can be taken.
OCL based vulnerability signatures can be applied for prevention of SQLI, XSS, Improper
Authentication, and Improper Authorization. Though this approach has not been directly used for
prevention of LDAP injection attacks, it can be modified accordingly [20].
Table 1 shows the source and scope of implementation for each mitigation technique discussed
above. Other types of mitigation techniques include those used to prevent SQL injection attacks.
Among several common types of query injection attacks, much of the research efforts have
focused on preventing SQL injection attacks [22, 24, 10, 11, 12]. In contrast, LDAP injection
attacks have not received enough attention.
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Table 1: Mitigation Techniques: Source and Scope of Implementation
Source

Mitigation Technique

Scope of Implementation

MT1

Administrator techniques
[15,22,25]

Password Policy Schema; Frequent
changing of Password; LDAP
Configuration; IP Firewall

LDAP injection

MT2

Developer techniques
[13,14]

Data validation and dynamic
checks; Outgoing data validation

LDAP injection

Program Transformations

SQL injection; LDAP
injection; Log injection; XSS
injection; Direct Static Code
injection

MT3

Prevention of Injection
Attacks by Rectification
policies [17]
Program transformation
techniques [18]

MT4

Application Security IDE
technique [19]

Interactive Code Refactoring;
Interactive Code Annotation; (still
in implementation stage)

Input validation; Broken
Access control; Cross-site
Request Forgery

MT5

Remote Code Execution
detection technique [20]

Static Analysis

Static Analysis

MT6

Static Analysis based
technique [21]

OCL-based vulnerability signature
approach

SQL injection; XSS injection;
Improper Authorization;
Improper Authentication

Table 2 provides a mapping of mitigation techniques to attack types. The symbols and 
indicate whether a mitigation technique is applicable or not to prevent the corresponding attack
types. The  symbol indicates that a mitigation technique has been applied to prevent other types
of attacks (SQL injection), but not LDAP Injection.

Table 2: Mapping mitigation techniques to attack type
Login
Bypass

Information
Disclosure

Privilege
Escalation

Information
Alteration

MT1









MT2









MT3









MT4









MT5









MT6
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As shown in Table 2, various mitigation techniques that have been developed and implemented
focusing on injection attacks in general but not particularly on LDAP injection attacks types.
Moreover, these techniques do not necessarily provide a complete solution to such injection
attacks. They are implemented to focus on a particular scenario, or provide a solution with prior
restrictions.

2.3

Comparison of SQL and LDAP Queries

Our work is motivated by the syntactical differences and usage between SQL and LDAP queries.
Techniques such as proxy-based approach of preventing SQL injection attacks [9], static analysis
[12], library class PreparedStatements in Java [26] can be used to prevent SQL query injection
attacks but cannot be directly applied to prevent LDAP query injection attacks.
Given the syntactic differences between SQL and LDAP, further discussed in Chapter 3 (Section
3.5), the injection attack inputs and the subsequent consequences are also different. For example,
a traditional tautology SQL injection attack may lead to deleting an entire table; whereas a
tautology LDAP injection attack may lead to leaking privileged information from a node at a
specific level in the directory tree [27, 28].

Table 3 illustrates the difference between LDAP and SQL query. A benign input is given in rows
1 and 2 and rows 3 and 4 consist of an attack input (username and password). The second and
third column shows the search query for LDAP (ldapQuery) and SQL (sqlQuery),
respectively. The second row shows the LDAP and SQL queries for the supplied benign input
(username

and password). In particular, the LDAP query has two expressions

(uid="pbulusu",

password="123456"), the results of these expressions are combined

logically with AND (&). The SQL query result is affected by the WHERE condition, where all
columns from table users for the rows having username and password columns as pbulusu and
123456, respectively, are returned.
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Table 3: LDAP vs. SQL query
LDAP Search Query

SQL Search Query

Benign
Input

Username: pbulusu
Password: 123456

Username: pbulusu
Password: 123456

Query with
benign input

ldapQuery="(&(uid="pbulusu")(
password="123456"))";

sqlQuery = 'SELECT * FROM users
WHERE username="pbulusu" AND
password= "123456"';

Attack input

Username: *)(uid=*))(|(uid=*
Password: ""

Username: ""
Password: "" OR ("1"="1)

Query with
attack input

ldapQuery="(&(uid=*)(uid=*))(
|(uid=*)(userPassword=""))";

sqlQuery = 'SELECT * FROM users
WHERE username="" AND
password="" OR ("1"="1")';

The third and fourth rows of Table 3 show attack inputs and corresponding queries for LDAP
and SQL, respectively. An attacker performs an LDAP query injection attack by providing the
username as '*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*' and the password as blank. The resultant LDAP query
becomes

ldapQuery="(&(uid=*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*)(userPassword=))",

which

would

return all user IDs from the directory tree. In contrast, an attacker performs a SQL query
injection attack by providing the username as "" and the password as "" OR ("1"="1). The
resultant SQL query becomes sqlQuery = 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE username="" AND
password="" OR ("1"="1")'. The WHERE condition will be evaluated as true, which would

return all selected rows from table users. Hence, an attacker can gain unauthorized access.
Different types of injection attacks such as SQL injections [6] and LDAP injections [3] have
been prevalent among web applications over the last decade. In fact, query injection flaws
remain as one of the top ranked web security vulnerabilities according to Open Web Application
Security Project (OWASP) report [7].

In the next Chapter, we present technology overview and discuss some more details of LDAP.
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CHAPTER 3
Technology Overview
3.1

Overview

This Chapter presents a technology overview of the LDAP protocol. Some more details of LDAP
such as formation of LDAP query, different nodes in LDAP such as Common Name (cn),
Distinguished Name (dn) etc. are introduced in this Chapter. It also includes an introduction to
SQL and the basic differences between LDAP and SQL.

3.2

Technology Overview

The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a commonly used protocol in
organizations for accessing information from directories. LDAP was developed by The Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) in order to find a simpler version of the existing Directory
Access Protocol X.500. The term 'Lightweight' in LDAP comes from the fact that there is a
reduction in the number of protocol overheads in comparison with the X.500 [2]. LDAP gains its
popularity because of features such as representation of data objects in hierarchical form, being
open source and relying on TCP/IP, which is necessary for Internet access. LDAP uses the
TCP/IP for its transport and network layers instead of Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI Model) stack which was used in the X.500. Some duplicate functions from X.500 standard
were eliminated in LDAP. It is significantly simpler and can be customized according to the
needs of a particular organization [29].

LDAP is particularly used for 'Write-once-Read-many' kind of applications. Thus, LDAP is
suitable for maintaining the contact information of all the employees in any organization which
would remain the same for a large period of time. However, LDAP is not suitable for
applications that require frequent content update such as online transaction processing and ecommerce. LDAP is highly suitable when the data being stored requires features such as crossplatform availability of data, access to data from a large number of computers or applications,
few changes of data, and storage of data in a single record [30].
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3.3

Formation of LDAP Query

The formation of an LDAP query consists of defining the LDAP Server details, connecting to the
LDAP server and binding to the LDAP server. Depending on the final requirement, the query
will consist of several operations such as search, update and delete. Figure 16 shows example
code that uses PHP to connect and bind to the LDAP server.

// configuration
1. $ldapserver = '192.168.1.124';

-- LDAP Server

2. $ldaptree

-- Defining DC (Domain Component)

= "dc=ubuntuldap2";

// connection to ldap server
3. $ldapconn = ldap_connect($ldapserver) or die("Could not connect to LDAP
server.");
4. ldap_set_option($ldapconn, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 3);
// verifying connection to ldap server
5. if($ldapconn){
// binding to ldap server
6.

$ldapbind = ldap_bind($ldapconn, "cn=admin,".$ldaptree, "admin") or die

("Please enter valid login credentials!");
// verify binding
7.
8.
11.

if ($ldapbind) {
Perform multiple tasks here...(Such as Search/Update/Delete)
}

12.}

Figure 16: Code for formation of LDAP query

In Figure 16, line 1 defines the IP address of the LDAP server. The LDAP tree with base domain
component (dc=ubuntuldap2) is defined in line 2. Line 3 establishes a connection to the LDAP
server through ldap_connect(…) method call. If the connection is unsuccessful, the script throws
an error stating 'Could not connect to LDAP server'. Line 4 sets the protocol version.
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Once the LDAP connection is verified in line 5, the next step is to bind to the LDAP server as
shown in line 6. Once the LDAP Binding is verified in line 7, the user can perform multiple tasks
based on the requirement.

3.4

Different Nodes in LDAP

Common nodes in an LDAP directory are defined as o (organization), dc (domain component),
ou (organizational unit), dn (distinguished name) and cn (common name) according to the X.500
Directory specification.

Data in LDAP is represented in a hierarchical tree structure called Data Information Tree (DIT).
The tree structure of LDAP directory is similar to the top-down representation of UNIX file
directories or Domain Name Server (DNS) trees. The top level in the LDAP tree structure is
referred to as the base dn and breaks down into individual objects, each of which is called an
entry. A simple representation of DIT is shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Diagrammatic representation of LDAP directory tree structure

Figure 17 shows the directory structure for a small company. The top-level node
in TinyCompany has an Organization (O) attribute. TinyCompany comprises of the Engineering,
Accounting, and Marketing departments which are represented with Organizational Unit (OU)
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entry (e.g., OU=Engineering). Accounting OU has two organizational units which are Accounts
Payable and Accounts Receivable. For example, the common name (CN) Kathy Lee is under the
OUs Accounts Payable and Accounting. It can thus be seen that, an entry can be composed of
one or more OUs. The Marketing OU has one printer resource (CN=Printer3) [31].

3.5

SQL and LDAP

SQL is a database query language whereas LDAP is a protocol used for accessing directory
service. There are significant differences between SQL and LDAP. First, LDAP is a protocol for
accessing directory data over the network, where directory information is faster and easier to
read. However, update and delete operations are expensive. On the other hand, SQL is a query
language that supports transactional operations on relational databases requiring frequent read,
write, update, and delete operations.

The data representation and organization between LDAP and SQL also remain largely dissimilar.
For example, LDAP stores directory data in a tree structure having a set of nodes and edges;
whereas SQL stores data in tables of a relational database. The LDAP tree may reside among
multiple machines in a network, whereas traditional SQL database stores tabular data in one
local machine.
At the syntax level, though there are some similarities between SQL and LDAP (e.g., =, >, <).
Operation wise, both support insertion, deletion, and viewing of data. However, there are
dissimilarities in syntax. For example, SQL “AND” means the logical AND operation, whereas
LDAP represents it as “&”. Further, SQL supports a rich set of aggregate (e.g., count, sum) and
join (e.g., inner join, outer join) operations for multiple queries. In contrast, LDAP has no such
support.
In the next Chapter, we introduce fault-injection based testing, some related work on faultinjection based testing, and our proposed approach.

34

CHAPTER 4
OCL Fault-Injection Based Testing Approach
4.1

Overview

This Chapter introduces the approach fault-injection based testing and covers some relevant
work on fault-injection based testing in Section 4.2. Next, we introduce Object Constraint
Language (OCL) and our proposed approach of OCL fault-injection based testing in Sections 4.3
and 4.4, respectively.

4.2

Related Work on Fault-Injection Based Testing

Fault-based testing technique is intended to generate or assess test cases by anticipating errors in
a system under test and deliberately inject faults in the system. This approach can demonstrate
only the presence of specific faults (injected), but not the absence of faults during testing. The
approach can identify effective test cases that can reveal specific faults we injected in the system
[32].
Some relevant works on fault-injection based testing [33-38] are shown in Table 4. These works
use this technique to test robustness of web application security scanner [33], effectiveness of
intrusion detection systems intended to detect network protocol level attacks [34], robustness of
router protocol implementation to tolerate malformed protocol data units against failure or
crashes [35], effectiveness of input validation routines in web applications implemented in PHP
[36], capability of handling malformed input PDF files by Java applications [37], robustness of
embedded applications against skipping login mechanism bypassing [38], utility applications
written in C/C++ [39], and evaluation of performance and security of web services [40].
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Table 4: Comparison of related work
Tool / Work
(Test Level)
Fonseca et al.
[33]

Vulnerability
covered

Source of test
cases

Test case generation method

Target
applications

SQLI and XSS

N/A

N/A

Web scanners

Buffer Overflow
(BOF), Format
String Bug (FSB)

Attack
templates

Inject fault in application and network
layer

Intrusion detection
systems

Tal et al. [35]

BOF

Protocol
syntax

Inject faults

Network router
algorithm
implementation
(daemons)

Kiezun et al.
[36]

SQLI and XSS

Source code

Solve path constraints in applications and
replace non malicious test cases with
attack test case

Web applications
in PHP

Vigna et al.
[34]

Testing of
program crash,
abnormal
Instrumenting class file using BCEL tool, Java, tested on PDF
Ghosh et al. behavior through
tester needs to select a program line to
generator
Java byte code
[37]
exceptions such as
replace with injected faulty line of code at application written
DocumentExcepti
Java opcode level
in Java
on, IOException
etc.
Applications
Bypassing
Faults injected at the assembly code level
running on
password
by changing the return address of a
embedded
Fouque et al.
checking through
N/A
function conducting access control check, hardware, used for
[38]
buffer overflow
with the next instruction as skipping
access control
exploit
access control
application such as
password checking
Replacing, adding or deleting source code,
Utility applications
replacing implemented function call with
Voas [39]
Buffer overflow Source code
such as FTP server
perturbed function call intended to lead
(wu-ftpd)
fault by altering parameter or return values
Performance of web services stacks are
Assess
evaluated using a benchmark called
performance
Oliveira et
WSTest with different SOAP object sizes
Web Service
anomaly of web Web service
al.[40]
and security of web services is evaluated
frameworks
service
using security testing tool called
frameworks
WSFAggressor
Incomplete or
Obtain constraints from design
Salas et al.
underdocuments, express constraints in Object Web applications
SQLI
[41]
specified
Constraint Language (OCL), finally
design
model
solving it with a constraint solver
Business Process
Anomaly of
Fault-injection
Grela et al.
Software Fault Injector for BPEL
Execution
Business
in BPEL
[42]
processes (SFIBP)
Language (BPEL)
Processes
processes
processes
Triangle type
Aichernig et
Model-based
N/A
Mutation of OCL specifications
determination
al.[32]
specifications
program
Derive pre-conditions and post-conditions
Source code
Our approach LDAP Injection
from flow graph, and mutate preWeb applications
and OCL
conditions and post-conditions
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A few approaches rely on application design level information to generate test cases. Salas et al.
[41] generate OCL constraints from UML class diagrams and solve them to generate test cases;
while Grela et al. [42] propose fault-injection in business processes expressed in Business
Process Execution Language.

Our work is closely related to the test case generation method presented by Aichernig et al. [32].
In their work, the authors have presented a method of test case generation for pre-condition and
post-condition specifications. They have generated Object Constraint Language (OCL)
specifications for a triangle type determination program, whereas we have generated OCL
specifications for PHP web applications relevant to LDAP query injection attacks. Our approach
also consists of generating control flow charts to identify needed pre and post-conditions.

In contrast to earlier work, our proposed technique obtains control flow from source code,
derives expected constraints and then applies faults in pre-conditions or post-conditions to
generate test cases to reveal LDAP injection vulnerabilities. We express pre-conditions and postconditions using OCL notation.

4.3

Object Constraint Language (OCL)

OCL is a language that complements Unified Modeling Language (UML) notations. OCL is used
to describe and enhance rules that are applicable to UML. Detailed aspects of a system design
can be precisely described using OCL which is not possible with UML alone. Thus, OCL is
widely used in model-driven engineering (MDE) techniques as a default language to express
model transformations, rules or code-generation templates. Use of OCL makes UML class
diagrams more precise as OCL is used to specify invariants of class attributes and pre-conditions
and post-conditions of class methods [43].

OCL helps in achieving automation of software development in UML. A combination of UML
and OCL helps developers generating effective and coherent models. OCL plays a key role in
Model Driven Architecture by enabling platform-specific models to communicate with platformindependent models [44].
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A UML class diagram 'Person' and its respective attributes 'name', 'address' and 'birthdate' is
shown in Figure 18. The generated OCL constraints are shown in Figure 19 [45].

Figure 18: Example of UML class diagram
1. context Person
2. inv fields_nonnull: self.birthdate -> notEmpty() and
self.name -> notEmpty()and self.address -> notEmpty()
3. context Person :: getAge():int
4. post positive_age : result >= 0
5. context Person :: setName(name:String): void
6. pre name_given: name -> notEmpty()
7. post name_set: self.name = name

Figure 19: OCL constraints for Class Person

Figure 19, line 2 defines an invariant for class 'Person' which indicate all three attributes to be
'non-empty'. Next, getAge() method (line 3) needs to satisfy the post-condition that age must be
a positive integer number (line 4). The method setName (line 5) has a pre-condition in line 6
which checks if the name attribute is not empty. In line 7, once the pre-condition is satisfied, the
given name is set to the name of the particular user.

4.4

Proposed OCL Fault-Injection Based Testing Approach

Ideally, we like to have a set of pre-conditions and post-conditions (expressed in OCL) to apply
fault injection on these conditions as part of the test case generation process. However, we rarely
have the design level information for a given implementation (e.g., class diagrams and
dependency). Given that, we follow a process (Figure 20) to capture set of conditions from
program source code.
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Figure 20: Generation of pre and post-conditions

Process for Generation of pre and post-conditions
Step 1. Examine the source code, identify functionalities of applications related to LDAP query
generation and invocation, and obtain class diagrams capturing the key class attributes that
may contribute to be part of pre and post-conditions.

Step 2. Develop a flow chart for application functionality.
Step 3. Record needed pre and post-conditions required for successful completion of functionalities.
The conditions are expressed in terms of class attributes captured in step 1.

Step 4. For each path in the flow chart, combine all pre and post-conditions by removing duplicate preconditions.

Once the list of pre and post-conditions is identified, we apply the fault adequate test case
generation algorithm discussed next.
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Algorithm: Fault adequate test case generator
Let the input and output for the fault adequate test case generator be given as follows:

Input: D ∈ {pre-conditions, post-conditions}
The intended design D is composed of valid pre-conditions and post-conditions, which when satisfied
will prevent the occurrence of LDAP injection attacks.

Output: T = {test cases revealing LDAP injection attack types}
Here, T = {t1, t2, ....} where tk = <ik, ok>; and ik is the kth input and ok is the kth output
Step 1: Given that the intended design is D, generate D' from D
where D' is the faulty design and
D' ∈ {pre', post'},
where pre' and post' define faulty pre-conditions and post-conditions respectively.
pre' is generated by randomly replacing one of the logical operator and relational operator
with other from the sets {OR, AND, NOT} and {≤, ≥}
Step 2: Define an input i such that i satisfies pre ∨ pre'.
(∨ indicates logical OR)
Step 3: Apply input i to D and D'.
Observe outputs o and o' for D(i) and D'(i) respectively.
If D(i) ≠ D'(i), accept the input i and include it in the set T = T ∪ {<i, o>} (good test case)
If D(i) = D'(i), reject input i and move to step 2.

In the next Chapter, we discuss the evaluation of our proposed approach to a number of case
studies.
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CHAPTER 5
Case Studies and Evaluation
5.1 Overview
In this Chapter, we demonstrate example applications of test case generation based on OCL Fault
Injection algorithm discussed in Chapter 4. We evaluate test case generation approach with an
open source PHP LDAP web application Self Service Password [46] which has been reported to
contain LDAP injection vulnerability in Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) [47].
Moreover, we demonstrate our approach for a developed web application having LDAP injection
vulnerabilities. We deploy both applications in an Apache web server having phpLDAPadmin
configured appropriately [48].

5.2 Case Study 1: Self Service Password (Login Bypass, Information Disclosure)
Self Service Password can be used to reset the password of an LDAP entity (common entity or
cn). We have used the source code of Self Service Password related to password change
functionalities to generate the pre and post-conditions. We find that there are three ways to
change password: reset by security questions, reset by old and new password and reset by
sending token in email. We evaluate our approach for reset by sending token in email option.
We first show the legitimate way of password reset in Figure 21. We assume that user Sam Price
has a legitimate login ID as sprice with a valid email ID given as x@xyz.com. The reset password
link will be sent to the email ID and the user can change his password by clicking on the link
provided in the email.
Figure 22 shows that an attacker can access the password reset link by providing input
containing wild card character (sp*) in the login ID field and email as x@xyz.com. Figure 23
shows that providing the above inputs result in receiving a password reset link (with token
information). This attack is an example of information disclosure and may further lead to login
bypass type of LDAP injection attack.
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Figure 21: Correct technique of changing password in Self Service Password

Figure 22: Attacker using '*' wildcard to access the system
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Figure 23: Confirmation email sent to the attacker

We now discuss the process for generation of pre and post-conditions (presented in Chapter 4).
The PHP code for vulnerable version of Self Service Password application is shown in Figure 24.
Process for Generation of pre and post-conditions
Step 1: The PHP code of the vulnerable version of Self Service Password is shown in Figure 24.
Here, Lines 2 and 8 retrieve Email ID and Login ID. Lines 22-24 use the login and email to form
LDAP query. Line 22 replaces the occurrence of the text '{login}' in variable '$ldap_filter'
with the value that is assigned to the variable '$login' which is the user entered value in login
field. Line 22 is not filtering out the meta characters which becomes the part of LDAP search and
leads to LDAP injection attacks. Line 13 connects with LDAP server, and Line 17 executes the
generated LDAP query.

...
1. if (isset($_POST["mail"]) and $_POST["mail"]){
2.
$mail = $_POST["mail"];
3. }
4. else {
5.
$result = "mailrequired";
6. }
7. if (isset($_REQUEST["login"]) and $_REQUEST["login"]) {
8.
$login = $_REQUEST["login"];
9. }
10.else {
11. $result = "loginrequired";
12.}
// omitted code ...
13. $ldap = ldap_connect($ldap_url);
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14. ldap_set_option($ldap, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 3);
15. ldap_set_option($ldap, LDAP_OPT_REFERRALS, 0);
16. if ( isset($ldap_binddn) && isset($ldap_bindpw) ) {
17. $bind = ldap_bind($ldap, $ldap_binddn, $ldap_bindpw);
18. }
19. else {
20. $bind = ldap_bind($ldap);
21. }
// omitted code ...
22. $ldap_filter = str_replace("{login}", $login, $ldap_filter);
23. $search = ldap_search($ldap, $ldap_base, $ldap_filter);
// omitted code ...
24. $mailValues = ldap_get_values($ldap, $entry, $mail_attribute);
// omitted code ...

Figure 24: PHP code for vulnerable version of Self Service Password application

Based on source code, we derive the class diagram as shown in Figure 25. Here, we show three
classes each representing password change for three different ways. In particular, password reset
by email has four attributes (loginid, emailid, logincount, emailcount) and three methods
(isValid(), isRegistered() and isTokenSent()).

Figure 25: Class diagram for Self Service Password application
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Step 2: We develop a flow chart as shown in Figure 26 for email token-based password reset
functionality. Here, a rectangle means steps (input or output), an ellipse means the start or end
state and a diamond is a decision making step where testing of conditions are performed.
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Figure 26: Flowchart for password change based on reset token sent via email
46

Step 3: Figure 26 shows various paths related to both successful and unsuccessful password
change by token sent to email. For example, the path showing successful password change
requires that Login ID and Email ID be not empty (loginid ≠ empty AND emailid ≠ empty),
Email ID is valid syntactically (isValid(emailid)), Email and Login ID counts are one, and Email
ID belongs to known registered email address (isRegisteredEmail(emailid)). The post-condition
is receiving a token by Email (captured as isTokenSent=TRUE). Similarly, we can capture pre
and post-conditions for other paths that would result in error message (total five paths). We can
obtain a set of pre and post-conditions for all six paths (P1-P6).
Step 4: Table 5 shows the combined pre and post-conditions for each of the six paths based on
Figure 26. There is no duplicate condition, so no reduction of conditions needs to be performed.

Table 5: Pre and post-conditions for Self Service Password
Path

pre-conditions

post-conditions

P1 (Success)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (email) ∧
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧
isRegisteredEmail (emailid)

isTokenSent()

P2 (Error1)

!(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty)

!isTokenSent()

P3 (Error2)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
!isValid(email)

!isTokenSent()

P4 (Error3)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
isValid(email) ∧
!(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1)

!isTokenSent()

P5 (Error4)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (email) ∧
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧
!isRegisteredEmail (emailid)

!isTokenSent()

P6 (Error5)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (email) ∧
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧
!isRegisteredEmail (emailid) ∧
!isTokenSent()

N/A

Now, we apply fault injection for each of the obtained pre-conditions (which becomes part of D)
to generate test cases. Below we illustrate the test case generation for path P1. Similarly, we can
apply for paths P2 - P6. Next, we apply the three steps of Fault adequate test case generator
Algorithm (discussed in Chapter 4).
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Algorithm: Fault adequate test case generator
Step 1: From D we obtain D'. We generate altered pre-conditions (pre'). Table 6 shows five
examples of altered pre-conditions (pre') for P1 where we replaced ∧ with ∨ randomly. This is
not an exhaustive list of all possible pre' but we show some examples for illustrative purposes.
Each expression relates to two input variables (or test inputs) represent two fields: loginid and
emailid. We assume that valid emailid is x@xyz.com and valid loginid is sprice. We also assume
that * is an invalid character and is not permitted as any part of the inputs for this application.
These set of valid inputs along with meta-characters will be combined to generate test cases that
we discuss next.
Table 6: Altered pre-conditions for Self Service Password (P1)
pre

pre'

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (email) ∧
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧
isRegisteredEmail (emailid)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (email) ∧
(emailCount = 1 ∨ loginCount = 1) ∧
isRegisteredEmail (emailid)

2

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (email) ∧
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧
isRegisteredEmail (emailid)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (email) ∧
(emailCount = 1 ∨ loginCount = 1) ∨
isRegisteredEmail (emailid)

3

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (email) ∧
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧
isRegisteredEmail (emailid)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∨
isValid (email) ∨
(emailCount = 1 ∨ loginCount = 1) ∨
isRegisteredEmail (emailid)

4

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (email) ∧
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧
isRegisteredEmail (emailid)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∨
isValid (email) ∨
(emailCount = 1 ∨ (loginCount = 1) ∨
isRegisteredEmail (emailid)

5

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (email) ∧
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧
isRegisteredEmail (emailid)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (email) ∧
(emailCount = 1 ∨(loginCount = 1) ∧
isRegisteredEmail (emailid)

Example

1

Step 2: The loginid in input i1 is sp* and emailid is a legitimate emailid given as x@xyz.com. For
checking if generated test input i1, from step 1 can satisfy pre ∨ pre’, we do further analysis as
shown in Table 7. Here, the second column shows a set of test inputs (i). Columns 3 and 4 in
Table 7 show whether the test input i satisfies pre and pre’. Column 5 shows that i1 satisfies pre
∨ pre’ based on step 2 in the algorithm.
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Step 3: Then, we apply each of the inputs i1-i5 in columns 6 and 7 to obtain output from original
program (D) and altered program (D’) under o and o’, respectively. The last column indicates if
the particular test case can be included in set T or not. A test input is added when o and o’are
dissimilar.

Table 7: Generation of test cases with altered pre and post-conditions for Self Service Password
(P1)
#

1

2

3

4

5

Input
i1 :
loginid = "sp*",
emailid =
"x@xyz.com"
i2 :
loginid = "sp*",
emailid =
"p@xyz.com"
i3 :
loginid = "sprice",
emailid = "*"
i4 :
loginid = "sp*",
emailid = "*"
i5 :
loginid = "sprice",
emailid =
"x@xyz.com"

pre
satisfied?

pre'
satisfied?

pre
∨
pre'

No

Yes

Yes

o1:
o'1:
isTokenSent = isTokenSent =
FALSE
TRUE

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

o2:
o'2:
isTokenSent = isTokenSent =
FALSE
TRUE

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Output D(i)

Output D'(i)

o3:
o'3:
isTokenSent = isTokenSent =
FALSE
TRUE
o4:
o'4:
isTokenSent = isTokenSent =
FALSE
TRUE
o5:
o'5:
isTokenSent = isTokenSent =
TRUE
TRUE

Include in
set T?

Yes

Yes

No

From Table 7, the first four test cases are added in test set T, and it is being enhanced T = T ∪
{(i1, o1), (i2, o2), (i3, o3), (i4, o4)} with vulnerability revealing test cases {< i1, o1>, < i2, o2>, < i3,
o3>, < i4, o4>}.
We now discuss more on each of the test inputs. For example, we assume that the loginid in
input i1 is given as sp* and the emailid is registered in the system. The loginid in input i2 is given
as sp* and the emailid is not registered in the system. Input i3 is given as a legitimate loginid
sprice and the emailid is *. Input i4 has loginid as sp* and the emailid is *.
In Table 7, rows 1, 2, 3 and 4 show input i. Columns 3 and 4 show whether i satisfies pre and
pre' (not satisfied for pre, satisfied for pre'). Column 5 shows that i satisfies pre ∨ pre' based on
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step 2 in the algorithm. Then, we apply input i in columns 6 and 7 to obtain output from D and
D’. The last column indicates if the particular test case can be included in set T or not, based on
conditions in step 4 (included for i1 - i4).
For the last input i5, we assume that the loginid is sprice and emailid is x@xyz.com, which are
both valid. Though the input satisfies both pre and pre', the output after applying to D and D’
become the same. Thus, it is not added in test set T.
Therefore, the final test set T after applying the algorithm results in selected test inputs as
follows: {<sp*, x@xyz.com>, <sp*, p@xyz.com>, <sprice, *>, <sp*, *>}. As we apply these
generated test inputs on the target application, we find that i1, i2, and i4 have the capability of
revealing login bypass injection attacks, and i3 can be applied for discovering privilege escalation
attack.
Note that all test cases may not be suitable for discovering vulnerabilities. Further, multiple test
cases may reveal the same vulnerability (e.g., both i1 and i2 can reveal login bypass attack). Our
approach enables developers to consider critical program input variables and program paths that
can contribute to LDAP injection vulnerabilities. Thus, our approach can generate and select
effective test cases revealing LDAP injection attacks based on altered program path constraints
expressed in OCL.

5.3 Case study 2: Custom Web Application (Login Bypass)
In this Section, we demonstrate the test case generation for Login Bypass injection attack. First
we show the process for generation of pre and post-conditions.
Process for Generation of pre and post-conditions
Step 1: We develop a class diagram as shown in Figure 27 capturing the key class attributes in
the source code.
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Figure 27: Class diagram for Custom application (Login Bypass)

Step 2: We develop a flow chart as shown in Figure 28 for login bypass LDAP injection attack
type. Here, a rectangle means steps (input or output), an ellipse means the start or end state and a
diamond is a decision making step where testing of conditions are performed.
Step 3: Figure 28 shows various paths related to both successful and unsuccessful login bypass
operation. For example, the path showing successful password change requires that Login ID and
Password be not empty (loginid ≠ empty AND password ≠ empty), Login ID is valid
syntactically (isValid(loginid)), Login ID count is one, and Password matches to the Login ID of
the particular user (isMatching(password)). The post-condition is user login (captured as
isLogin=TRUE). Similarly, we can capture pre and post-conditions for other paths that would
result in error message (total five paths). We can obtain a set of pre and post-conditions for all
six paths (P1-P6).
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Figure 28: Flowchart for login bypass type of LDAP injection attack

Step 4: Table 8 shows the combined pre and post-conditions for each of the six paths based on
Figure 28. There is no duplicate condition, so no reduction of conditions needs to be performed.
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Table 8: Pre and post-conditions for Login Bypass
Path

pre-conditions

post-conditions

P1 (Success)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (loginid) ∧ loginCount = 1 ∧
isMatching (password)

isLogin()

P2 (Error1)

!(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty)

!isLogin()

P3 (Error2)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧
!isValid(loginid)

!isLogin()

P4 (Error3)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧
isValid(loginid) ∧
!(loginCount = 1)

!isLogin()

P5 (Error4)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (loginid) ∧
(loginCount = 1) ∧
!isMatching (password)

!isLogin()

P6 (Error5)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (loginid) ∧
(loginCount = 1) ∧
!isMatching (password) ∧
!isLogin()

N/A

Now, we apply the three steps of Fault adequate test case generator Algorithm to illustrate the
test case generation for path P1 (Table 8).

Algorithm: Fault adequate test case generator
Step 1: From D we obtain D'. We generate altered pre- conditions (pre'). Table 9 shows two
examples of altered pre-conditions (pre') for P1 where we replaced ∧ with ∨ randomly. Table 9
shows two examples (non-exhaustive) of pre' that we generate by randomly substituting AND
with OR in pre (changes are shown in bold in the third column). Each expression relates to two
input variables (or test inputs) represent two fields: loginid and password. We assume that valid
emailid is x@xyz.com and valid loginid is sprice. We also assume that * is an invalid character
and is not permitted as any part of the inputs for this application. These set of valid inputs along
with meta-characters will be combined to generate test cases that we discuss next.
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Table 9: Altered pre-conditions and test inputs for Login Bypass (P1)
Example

pre'

pre

1

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧ (loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∨
isValid (loginid) ∧ loginCount = 1 ∧
isValid (loginid) ∨ loginCount = 1 ∨
isMatching (password)
isMatching (password)

2

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧ (loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧
isValid (loginid) ∧ loginCount = 1 ∧
isValid (loginid) ∧ loginCount = 1 ∨
isMatching (password)
isMatching (password)

Step 2: The loginid in input i1 is given as *)(uid=*))(|(uid=*) and password is given as abcdef.
For checking if generated test input i1, from step 1 can satisfy pre ∨ pre’, we do further analysis
as shown in Table 10. Here, the second column shows a set of test inputs (i). Columns 3 and 4 in
Table 10 show whether the test input i satisfies pre and pre’. Column 5 shows that i1 satisfies pre
∨ pre’ based on step 2 in the algorithm.

Step 3: Then, we apply each of the inputs i1 - i2 in columns 6 and 7 to obtain output from original
program (D) and altered program (D’) under o and o’, respectively. The last column indicates if
the particular test case can be included in set T or not. A test input is added when o and o’are
dissimilar. From Table 10, the first test case can be added in test set T, and it is being enhanced T
= T ∪ {i1, o1} with vulnerability revealing test case < i1, o1>.

Table 10: Generation of test cases with altered pre and post-conditions for Login Bypass (P1)
#

1

2

Input
i1 :
loginid =
"*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*)",
password = "abcdef"
i2 :
loginid = "sprice",
password = "prices"

pre
satisfied?

pre'
satisfied?

pre
∨
pre'

Output
D(i)

Output
D'(i)

Include
in set T?

No

Yes

Yes

o1:
isLogin
= TRUE

o'1:
isLogin =
FALSE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

o2:
isLogin
= TRUE

o'2:
isLogin =
TRUE

No

For example, we assume that the loginid in input i2 is given as sprice and the password is a
legitimate password as prices. Though the input satisfies both pre and pre', the output after
applying it on D and D’ remains the same. Thus, test input i2 is not added in test set T.
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Therefore, the final test set T after applying the algorithm results in selected test input and output
as: {<*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*), abcdef>}. As we apply this generated test inputs on the target
application, we find that i1 has the capability of revealing login bypass injection attack.

5.4 Case study 3: Custom Web Application (Privilege Escalation)
In this Section, we demonstrate the test case generation for Privilege Escalation type of LDAP
injection attack. We apply the process for generation of pre and post-conditions below.
Process for Generation of pre and post-conditions
Step 1: We develop a class diagram as shown in Figure 29 capturing the key class attributes in
the source code.

Figure 29: Class diagram for Custom application (Privilege Escalation)

Step 2: We develop a flow chart as shown in Figure 30 for privilege escalation LDAP injection
attack type. Here, a rectangle means steps (input or output), an ellipse means the start or end state
and a diamond is a decision making step where testing of conditions are performed.
Step 3: Figure 30 shows various paths related to both successful and unsuccessful privilege
escalation scenarios.
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Figure 30: Flowchart for privilege escalation type of LDAP injection attack

Step 4: Table 11 shows the combined pre and post-conditions for each of the five paths based on
Figure 30. There is no duplicate condition, so no reduction of conditions needs to be performed.
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Table 11: Pre and post-conditions for Privilege Escalation
Path

pre-conditions

post-conditions

P1 (Success)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧
(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ isOu(loginid) =
Ou(document) ∧ isSecuritylevel(loginid) =
Securitylevel(document)

Display
Documents

P2 (Error1)

!(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty)

Display
Documents fail

P3 (Error2)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧
!(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty)

Display
Documents fail

P4 (Error3)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧
(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ !(isOu(loginid) =
Ou(document))

Display
Documents fail

P5 (Error4)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧
(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ isOu(loginid) =
Ou(document) ∧ !(isSecuritylevel(loginid) =
Securitylevel(document))

N/A

Now, we apply the three steps of Fault adequate test case generator Algorithm for paths P1 and
P3.

Algorithm: Fault adequate test case generator
Step 1: We generate altered pre-conditions (pre'). Table 12 shows three examples of altered preconditions (pre') where the first and second rows correspond to P1 and the third row corresponds
to P3. Here, we randomly replaced ∧ with ∨ (changes are shown in bold font in the third
column). Each expression relates to two input variables (or test inputs) represent two fields:
loginid and ou. We assume that valid emailid is x@xyz.com and valid loginid is sprice. We also
assume that * is an invalid character for this application. These set of valid inputs along with
meta-characters will be combined to generate test cases that we discuss next.
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Table 12: Altered pre-conditions and test inputs for Privilege Escalation (P1 and P3)
Example

pre'

pre

1
(P1)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∨
(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ (getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧
isOu(loginid) = Ou(document) ∧
isOu(loginid) = Ou(document) ∧
isSecuritylevel(loginid) =
isSecuritylevel(loginid) =
Securitylevel(document)
Securitylevel(document)

2
(P1)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧
(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ (getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∨
isOu(loginid) = Ou(document) ∧
isOu(loginid) = Ou(document) ∨
isSecuritylevel(loginid) =
isSecuritylevel(loginid) =
Securitylevel(document)
Securitylevel(document)

3
(P3)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧
!(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty)

(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∨
!(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty)

Step 2: The loginid in input i1 is given as sprice and ou is given as *. For checking if generated
test input i1, from step 1 can satisfy pre ∨ pre’, we do further analysis as shown in Table 13.
Here, the second column shows a set of test inputs (i). Columns 3 and 4 in Table 13 show
whether the test input i satisfies pre and pre’. Column 5 shows that i1 satisfies pre ∨ pre’ based
on step 2 in the algorithm.
Step 3: We apply each of the inputs i1 - i3 in columns 6 and 7 (Table 13) to obtain output from
original program (D) and altered program (D’) under o and o’, respectively. The last column
indicates if the particular test case can be included in set T or not, based on conditions in step 4.
A test input is added when o and o’are dissimilar. From Table 13, test cases 1 and 2 can be
added in test set T, and it is being enhanced T = T ∪ {(i1, o1), (i2, o2)} with vulnerability revealing
test cases {< i1, o1>, < i2, o2>}.
Let us consider the example shown in the first row (Table 13). The loginid is given as sprice and
ou is given as *. Columns 3 and 4 show whether i satisfies pre and pre' (not satisfied for pre,
satisfied for pre'). Column 5 shows that i satisfies pre ∨ pre' based on step 2 in the algorithm.
Then, we apply input i1 in columns 6 and 7 to obtain output from D and D’. The last column
indicates if the particular test case can be included in set T or not, which indicates that i1 can be
included as a test case. Similarly, i2 can be included in set T.
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Table 13: Generation of test cases with altered pre and post-conditions for Privilege Escalation (P1
and P3)
#

Input

1

i1 :
loginid = " sprice ",
ou = "*"

2

3

i2 :
loginid = " sp* ",
ou = "*"
i3 :
loginid = "sprice"
ou = "SalesRep"

pre
pre'
satisfied? satisfied?
No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

pre
∨
pre'

Output D(i)

Output D'(i)

o1:
o'1:
Yes Display Documents Display Documents
= FALSE
fail = TRUE
o2:
o'2:
Yes Display Documents Display Documents
= FALSE
fail = TRUE
o3:
o'3:
Yes Display Documents Display Documents
= TRUE
= TRUE

Include
in set T?
Yes

Yes

No

Let us consider the third example. We assume that loginid is sprice and ou is SalesRep. Though
the input satisfies both pre and pre', the output after applying on D and D’ remains the same.
Thus, it is not added in test set T.
Therefore, the final test set T after applying Fault adequate test case generator Algorithm results
in test input and output as: {<sprice,*>, <sp*,*>}. As we apply this generated test inputs on the
target application, we find that i1 and i2 have the capability of revealing privilege escalation
injection attacks.

5.5 Case study 4: Custom Web Application (Information Alteration)
In this Section, we demonstrate the test case generation for Information Alteration type of LDAP
injection attack. We apply the four steps of process for generation of pre and post-conditions
below.
Process for Generation of pre and post-conditions
Step 1: We develop a class diagram as shown in Figure 31 capturing the key class attributes in
the source code.
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Figure 31: Class diagram for Custom application (Information Alteration)

Step 2: We develop a flow chart as shown in Figure 32 for information alteration LDAP
injection attack type. Here, a rectangle means steps (input or output), an ellipse means the start or
end state and a diamond is a decision making step where testing of conditions are performed.
Step 3: Figure 32 shows various paths related to both successful and unsuccessful information
alteration scenarios.
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Figure 32: Flowchart for information alteration type of LDAP injection attack

Step 4: Table 14 shows the combined pre and post-conditions for each of the four paths based on
Figure 32. There is no duplicate condition, so no reduction of conditions needs to be performed.
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Table 14: Pre and post-conditions for Information Alteration
Path

pre-conditions

post-conditions

P1 (Success)

(replacewith ≠ empty ∧ dn ≠ empty) ∧
isValid(dn) ∧ (isOu(loginid) = Ou(dn))

Replace Entry

P2 (Error1)

!(replacewith ≠ empty)

P3 (Error2)

!(dn ≠ empty)

P4 (Error3)

!(isValid(dn))

P5 (Error4)

!(isOu(loginid) = Ou(dn))

Replace Entry
fail
Replace Entry
fail
Replace Entry
fail
N/A

Now, we apply the three steps of Fault adequate test case generator Algorithm for path P1.

Algorithm: Fault adequate test case generator
Step 1: From D we obtain D'. We generate altered pre- conditions (pre'). Table 15 shows two
examples of altered pre-conditions (pre') for P1 where we replaced ∧ with ∨ randomly. This is
not an exhaustive list of all possible pre' but we show some examples for illustrative purposes.
Each expression relates to two input variables (or test inputs) represent two fields: replacewith
and dn. We assume that valid dn is uid=sprice, cn=SalesRep, ou=Sales,dc=ubuntuldap2. We
also assume that * is an invalid character and is not permitted as any part of the inputs for this
application. These set of valid inputs along with meta-characters will be combined to generate
test cases that we discuss next. We discuss the input i1 in which a document is being replaced.
Step 2: The replacewith in input i1 is given as randomlink and dn is given as uid=jreed,
cn=SeniorMgmt, ou=SeniorMgmt, dc=ubuntuldap2. For checking if generated test input i1,
from step 1 can satisfy pre ∨ pre’, we do further analysis as shown in Table 16. Here, the
second column shows a set of test inputs (i). Columns 3 and 4 in Table 16 show whether the test
input i satisfies pre and pre’. Column 5 shows that i1 satisfies pre ∨ pre’.
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Table 15: Altered pre-conditions and test inputs for Information Alteration (P1)
Example

pre

pre'

1

(replacewith ≠ empty ∧
dn ≠ empty) ∧
isValid(dn) ∧
(isOu(loginid) = Ou(dn))

(replacewith ≠ empty ∧
dn ≠ empty) ∨
isValid(dn) ∧
(isOu(loginid) = Ou(dn))

2

(replacewith ≠ empty ∧
dn ≠ empty) ∧
isValid(dn) ∧
(isOu(loginid) = Ou(dn))

(replacewith ≠ empty ∨
dn ≠ empty) ∨
isValid(dn) ∧
(isOu(loginid) = Ou(dn))

Step 3: We apply each of the inputs i1 and i2 in columns 6 and 7 to obtain output from original
program (D) and altered program (D’) under o and o’, respectively. The last column indicates if
the particular test case can be included in set T or not. A test input is added when o and o’ are
dissimilar.
From Table 16, the first test case can be added to test set T, and it is being enhanced T = T ∪ {i1,
o1} with vulnerability revealing test case < i1, o1>.

Table 16: Generation of test cases with altered pre and post-conditions for Information Alteration
(P1)
#

Input

pre
pre'
satisfied? satisfied?

pre
∨
pre'

Output D(i)

Output D'(i)

Include
in set
T?

1

i1:
replacewith = "randomlink"
dn = "uid=jreed,cn=SeniorMgmt,ou=
SeniorMgmt,dc=ubuntuldap2"

No

Yes

Yes

o4:
ReplaceEntry
= TRUE

o'4:
ReplaceEntry
= FALSE

Yes

2

i2:
replacewith = "correctlink"
dn = "uid=jreed,cn=SeniorMgmt,ou=
SeniorMgmt,dc=ubuntuldap2"

Yes

Yes

Yes

o5:
isLogin =
TRUE

o'5:
isLogin =
TRUE

No

For example, we assume that the replacewith in input i2 is given as correctlink and the dn is the
dn of the user logged in. Though the input satisfies both pre and pre', the output after applying it
on D and D’ remains same. Thus, it is not added to test set T.
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Therefore, the final test set T after applying the algorithm results in test input and output as:
{<replacewith="randomlink";dn=uid=jreed,cn=SeniorMgmt,ou=SeniorMgmt,dc=ubuntuldap2>}.
As we apply this generated test inputs on the target application, we find that i1 has the capability
of revealing information alteration injection attack.
Thus, our approach enables developers to generate effective test cases based on OCL fault
injection approach to detect LDAP injection vulnerabilities.
The next Chapter demonstrates tool implementation in which we have automated the process of
random OR replacement.
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CHAPTER 6
Tool Implementation
6.1 Overview
In this Chapter, we demonstrate a tool which can be used for the selection of test cases. The test
cases mentioned earlier in Chapter 5 were generated manually. We demonstrate implementation
of tool by using Self Service Password and Login Bypass case studies (mentioned earlier in
Chapter 5, Section 5.2 and 5.3) as examples. We apply a common measure to assess the quality
of generated test cases called Mutation Score (MS) [49]. It is the ratio between the number of test
cases included in the test set T to the total number of test cases generated. The Mutation Score is
affected by the combination of user inputs. When the input values include high number of
erroneous (invalid) inputs, the algorithm tends to generate high number of test cases to be
included in the test set T. For example, when the user inputs are all valid, the number of
generated test cases that can be included in the test set T are either zero or a minimum number
possible. This leads to a low mutation score. On the other hand, when the inputs are all invalid, it
is most likely that all or a high number of generated test cases are included in the test set T,
leading to a high mutation score.

6.2 Tool implementation for Self Service Password
Example 1:
First, we have the questions based on the application of Self Service Password. We defined six
attributes based on the application implementation to represent pre-conditions. Depending upon
the options selected at this point, the tool randomly substitutes AND with OR and provides us all
the possible combinations for this substitution. Developers are required to generate initial test
cases that can satisfy the generated constraints.
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Figure 33: Questions based on Self Service Password application

Figure 34: Selected options for Self Service Password application (Example 1)

For example, the options are selected as shown in Figure 34. For the given selection an example
input can be Login: sp*; Email: x@xyz.com.
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Boolean values are assigned to each entity (field) as shown in Figure 35. These values are based
on the selection from the previous page. Also, our pre-condition for the Self Service password
application is [(a ∧ b) ∧ c ∧ (d ∧ e) ∧ f] which should be satisfied for a successful operation.

Figure 35: Assigned Boolean values based on selection (Example 1)

Once we have the Boolean values assigned depending on the given selection, the options
available for logical OR Replacements are shown in Figure 36.

Figure 36: Available OR replacement options

Let us check the selection of test cases for each OR replacement option.
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4 OR Replacement Result Set:

Based on the last column of the 4 OR Replacement screenshot, all test cases are relevant to
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of
5/5 or 100%.
3 OR Replacement Result Set:
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Based on the last column of the 3 OR Replacement screenshot, all test cases are relevant to
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of
10/10 or 100%.
2 OR Replacement Result Set:

Based on the last column of the 2 OR Replacement screenshot, eight test cases are relevant to
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of
8/10 or 80%.
1 OR Replacement Result Set:
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Based on the last column of the 1 OR Replacement screenshot, two test cases are relevant to
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of
2/5 or 40%.
Example 2:
First, we have the questions based on the application of Self Service Password. For example, the
options are selected as shown in Figure 37.

Figure 37: Selected options for Self Service Password application (Example 2)

Boolean values are assigned to each entity (field) as shown in Figure 38. These values are based
on the selection from the previous page. Also, our pre-condition for the Self Service password
application is [(a ∧ b) ∧ c ∧ (d ∧ e) ∧ f] which should be satisfied for a successful operation.
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Figure 38: Assigned Boolean values based on selection (Example 2)

Let us check the selection of test cases for each OR replacement option.
4 OR Replacement Result Set:

Based on the last column of the 4 OR Replacement screenshot, all test cases are relevant to
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of
5/5 or 100%.
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3 OR Replacement Result Set:

Based on the last column of the 3 OR Replacement screenshot, nine test cases are relevant to
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of
9/10 or 90%.
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2 OR Replacement Result Set:

Based on the last column of the 2 OR Replacement screenshot, seven test cases are relevant to
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of
7/10 or 70%.
1 OR Replacement Result Set:

Based on the last column of the 1 OR Replacement screenshot, two test cases are relevant to
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of
2/5 or 40%.
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6.3 Tool implementation for Custom web application (Login Bypass)
First, we have the questions based on custom web application for Login Bypass. We defined
three attributes based on the implementation to represent pre-conditions. Depending upon the
options selected at this point, the tool helps us randomly substituting AND with OR and gives us
all the possible combinations for this substitution.

Figure 39: Questions based on custom web application for Login Bypass

Figure 40: Selected options for Self Service Password application

For example, the options are selected as shown in Figure 40. For the given selection an example
input can be Login: sprice; Password: (empty)
Boolean values are assigned to each entity (field) as shown in Figure 41. These values are based
on the selection from the previous page. Also, our pre-condition for custom application for login
bypass is [(a ∧ b) ∧ c] which should be satisfied for a successful operation.
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Figure 41: Assigned Boolean values based on selection

Once we have the Boolean values assigned depending on the given selection, the options
available for logical OR Replacements are shown in Figure 42.

Figure 42: Available OR replacement option

Let us check the selection of test cases for OR replacement option.
1 OR Replacement Result Set:
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Based on the last column of the 1 OR Replacement screenshot, all test cases are relevant to
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of
2/2 or 100%.

Thus, the developed tool helps in selection of test cases which might be vulnerable to injection
attacks, thereby allowing developers to develop secure web applications.

In the next Chapter, we present the dissemination of our research results.
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CHAPTER 7
Dissemination of Research Results
This chapter shows dissemination of thesis results as poster presentations and conference papers.
Below we list the title, abstract, and venue for each dissemination.
Detection of Lightweight Directory Access Protocol Query Injection attacks in Web
Applications
Pranahita Bulusu, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad.
Poster presentation. Kennesaw State University - Computer Science Student Expo 2015, Marietta,
GA, USA, December 2015
Abstract
LDAP is a directory access protocol commonly used in web applications to provide lookup
information and enforcing authentication mechanism. However, poorly implemented web
applications suffer from LDAP injection vulnerabilities that might lead to security breaches
such as login bypassing, privilege escalation, information disclosure, and information
alteration. Testing for the presence of LDAP injection attacks can help to discover
vulnerabilities early and fix implementation. Towards this direction, generating effective test
cases is important and requires systematic approach. This paper proposes fault injectionbased testing of LDAP injection attacks based on program implementation. We extract design
level information and constraints (in the form of pre-conditions and post-conditions)
highlighting behaviors that should be maintained throughout application runtime. We express
the constraints using a popular modeling language called OCL. We randomly alter the
captured pre-conditions and post-conditions and solve them to generate suitable test cases
that may have the capability to check for the presence of LDAP injection vulnerabilities. We
proposed needed algorithms to implement our test case generation approach. We did an initial
case study for an open source PHP application. The analysis shows that our approach can
generate effective test cases to discover LDAP injection vulnerabilities.

OCL Fault Injection-Based Testing of LDAP Query Injection Attacks
Pranahita Bulusu, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad.
Conference paper submission in progress.
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Abstract
LDAP is a directory access protocol commonly used in web applications to provide lookup
information and enforcing authentication mechanism. However, poorly implemented web
applications suffer from LDAP injection vulnerabilities that might lead to security breaches
such as login bypassing, privilege escalation, information disclosure, and information
alteration. Testing for the presence of LDAP injection attacks can help to discover
vulnerabilities early and fix implementation. Towards this direction, generating effective test
cases is important and requires systematic approach. This paper proposes fault injectionbased testing of LDAP injection attacks based on program implementation. We extract design
level information and constraints (in the form of pre-conditions and post-conditions)
highlighting behaviors that should be maintained throughout application runtime. We express
the constraints using a popular modeling language called OCL. We randomly alter the
captured pre-conditions and post-conditions and solve them to generate suitable test cases
that may have the capability to check for the presence of LDAP injection vulnerabilities. We
proposed needed algorithms to implement our test case generation approach. We did an initial
case study for an open source PHP application. The analysis shows that our approach can
generate effective test cases to discover LDAP injection vulnerabilities.

Classification of Lightweight Directory Access Protocol Query Injection Attacks and
Mitigation Techniques
Pranahita Bulusu, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad.
Conference Proceedings. Proceedings of 2015 International Conference on Collaboration
Technologies and Systems (CTS 2015), Atlanta, GA, USA, June 2015, IEEE CS Press, pp. 337344, ISBN: 978-1-4673-7648-8/15
Abstract
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is used in a large number of web
applications, and therefore, different types of LDAP injection attacks are becoming common.
These injection attacks take advantage of an application not validating inputs before being
used as part of LDAP queries. An attacker can provide inputs that may result in the alteration
of intended LDAP query structure. The attacks can lead to various types of security breaches
including Login Bypassing, Information Disclosure, Privilege Escalation, and Information
Alteration. Despite many research efforts to prevent LDAP injection attacks, many web
applications remain vulnerable to such attacks. In particular, there has been little attention
given to implement and test secure web applications that can mitigate LDAP query injection
attacks. More attention has been given to prevent Structured Query Language (SQL) injection
attacks but these mitigation techniques cannot be directly applied in order to prevent LDAP
injection attacks. This work provides analysis and classification of various types of LDAP
injection attacks and mitigation techniques used to prevent them, and it highlights the
differences between SQL and LDAP injection attacks.
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OCL Fault-Injection Based Testing of LDAP Query Injection Attacks
Pranahita Bulusu, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad.
Poster presentation. Kennesaw State University - Computer Science Student Expo 2015,
Kennesaw, GA, USA, April 2015
Abstract
LDAP is a popular protocol for Directory Service. Data objects are represented in
hierarchical form. Web applications relying on LDAP-based data object storing and retrieval
may suffer from injection attacks due to lack or improper input validation. Common LDAP
injection attacks include (i) Login Bypassing, (ii) Information Disclosure, (iii) Privilege
Escalation, and (iv) Information Alteration.

Lightweight Directory Access Protocol Query Injection Attacks in Web Applications
Pranahita Bulusu, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad.
Poster presentation. Kennesaw State University - Computer Science Student Expo 2014,
Kennesaw, GA, USA, December 2014
Abstract
LDAP is a popular protocol for Directory Service. Data objects are represented in
hierarchical form. Web applications relying on LDAP-based data object storing and retrieval
may suffer from injection attacks due to lack or improper input validation. Common LDAP
injection attacks include (i) Login Bypassing, (ii) Information Disclosure, (iii) Privilege
Escalation, and (iv) Information Alteration.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
LDAP code injection vulnerability can be exploited to perform security breaches in web
applications such as login bypassing and privilege escalation. Among well-known code injection
attacks, LDAP injection has been least addressed and they do not share much similarities with
other types of injection attacks (e.g., SQL Injection) [6]. We proposed OCL fault injection based
testing approach to generate LDAP injection vulnerability revealing test cases. We extracted
design level information and constraints (in the form of pre and post-conditions) highlighting
behaviors that should be maintained throughout application runtime. We expressed the
constraints using a popular modeling language called OCL. We evaluated our approach with two
PHP web applications.

From the extensive survey we have done (Chapter 2), we find that most literature works are
intended for other common code injection attacks, but not specifically for LDAP. We find that
LDAP and SQL query have dissimilarities and attack inputs and contexts are also dissimilar.
Further, few literature works have mostly focused on login bypass type of attacks, leaving the
other three attacks types (information disclosure, privilege escalation, information alteration)
unaddressed.

We have proposed two algorithms in Chapter 4. The first algorithm addresses the generation of
pre and post-conditions from application source code where design level information is missing.
The outcome of the algorithm is a set of combined pre-conditions for various program paths. The
second algorithm then alters the pre-conditions with the goal of generating and selecting
effective test cases that can detect the presence of LDAP query injection vulnerabilities.

Chapter 5 illustrates the application of the algorithms for two PHP web applications, including
one having reported vulnerabilities (login bypass and information disclosure) based on OSVDB.
We built a custom web application to validate our approach for login bypass, privilege escalation
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and information alteration type attacks. The evaluation indicates that our approach can generate
suitable test cases having specific inputs capable of revealing LDAP injection vulnerabilities.

Chapter 6 discusses the implementation of a tool to automate the generation of altered pre
conditions so that developers can assess if a given input is vulnerable to LDAP injection attacks.
The tools can support the replacement of one logical operator with another, and in multiple
locations of a given pre-condition. Developers can integrate our proposed OCL fault injection
based approach to detect LDAP query injection attacks.

The proposed approach is targeted for application developers to be able to generate test sets with
high mutation score so that included test cases can detect LDAP injection attacks with high
probability.

8.2 Future Work
Future work includes applying OCL fault-injection based testing approach to more web
applications and to test other types of code injection vulnerabilities. We plan to generalize our
implemented tool’s input taking mechanism so that users can specify their input fields and
constraints to generate pre-conditions. We like to automate the generation of initial test input and
alter pre-conditions for relational operators. Currently, our approach does not automatically
extract class design level information from source code. We plan to develop or employ suitable
tools for extracting design level information.
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Appendix A: Source Code
Index.php
<center>
<h1>Log in to LDAP Server</h1>
<form action="login_action.php" method="post">
<input type="text" name="userid"/>
<input type="password" name="password"/>
<input type="submit" name="submit" />
</form>
</center>

Login_action.php
<?php
set_time_limit(30);
error_reporting(E_ALL);
ini_set('error_reporting', E_ALL);
ini_set('display_errors',1);
// config
$ldapserver = '192.168.1.124';
$ldapuser
= $_POST['userid'];
$ldappass
= $_POST['password'];
$ldaptree
= "dc=ubuntuldap2";
if (empty($ldapuser) || empty($ldappass)) {
echo "Please enter the login credentials. <a
href='javascript:history.back()'>Back</a>";
} else {
// connect
$ldapconn = ldap_connect($ldapserver) or die("Could not connect to LDAP
server.");
ldap_set_option($ldapconn, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 3);
if($ldapconn) {
// binding to ldap server
$ldapbind = ldap_bind($ldapconn, "cn=admin,".$ldaptree, "admin") or
die ("Please enter valid login credentials. <a
href='javascript:history.back()'>Back </a>");
// verify binding
if ($ldapbind) {
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$search = "(&(&(uid=".$ldapuser.")(userPassword=".$ldappass.")))";
$sr=ldap_search($ldapconn, $ldaptree, $search);
$info = ldap_get_entries($ldapconn, $sr);
if ($info["count"] > 0) {
echo "<center>";
echo "You are logged in as: ".$ldapuser." <a
href='logout.php'>Logout</a><br>";
echo "<h2>Your details</h2>";
$ii=0;
for ($i=0; $ii<$info[$i]["count"]; $ii++){
$data = $info[$i][$ii];
echo
$data.":&nbsp;&nbsp;".$info[$i][$data][0]."<br>";
}
$ou = $info[0]["ou"][0];
$sec_level = $info[0]["description"][0];
echo "<table border=1>";
echo "<th colspan=2><h2>Main Menu</h2></th>";
echo "<tr><td><a
href='searchusers.php?ou=".$ou."'>Search for Users</a></td></tr>";
echo "<tr><td><a
href='documents.php?uid=".$ldapuser."&ou=".$ou."&securitylevel=".$sec_lev
el."'>Available Documents</a></td></tr>";
echo "<tr><td><a
href='add.php?uid=".$ldapuser."&ou=".$ou."'>Add User</a></td></tr>";
echo "<tr><td><a
href='replace.php?uid=".$ldapuser."&ou=".$ou."'>Replace</a></td></tr>";
echo "<tr><td><a
href='modify.php?uid=".$ldapuser."&ou=".$ou."'>Update</a></td></tr>";
echo "<tr><td><a
href='delete.php?uid=".$ldapuser."&ou=".$ou."'>Delete</a></td></tr>";
echo "</table>";
echo "</center>";
} else {
echo "<center>";
echo "Please check your ID and Password";
echo "</center>";
}
}
}
// all done? clean up
ldap_close($ldapconn);
}
?>
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Replace.php
<?php
set_time_limit(30);
error_reporting(E_ALL);
ini_set('error_reporting', E_ALL);
ini_set('display_errors',1);
// config
$ldapserver = '192.168.1.124';
$ldaptree
= "dc=ubuntuldap2";
// connect
$ldapconn = ldap_connect($ldapserver) or die("Could not connect to LDAP
server.");
ldap_set_option($ldapconn, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 3);
if($ldapconn) {
// binding to ldap server
$ldapbind = ldap_bind($ldapconn, "cn=admin,dc=ubuntuldap2", "admin")
or die ("Please enter valid login credentials. <a
href='javascript:history.back()'>Back </a>");
// verify binding
if ($ldapbind) {
echo "<center>";
echo "<h2>Enter the Details</h2>";
echo "<form action=replace_action.php method=post>";
echo "<table border=1>";
echo "<tr><td>ObjectClass</td><td><select
name=objectclass><option value=user>User</option><option
value=document>Document</option></select></td></tr>";
echo "<tr><td>Replacing Object</td><td><select
name=replaceobj><option value=givenname>givenName</option><option
value=description>Description(If Document, paste
link)</option></select></td></tr>";
echo "<tr><td>Replace With</td><td><input type=text
name=replace></td></tr>";
echo "<tr><td>DN</td><td><input type=text
name=dn></td></tr>";
echo "<tr><td colspan=2 align=center><input type=hidden
name=ou value=".$_GET['ou']."></td></tr>";
echo "<tr><td colspan=2 align=center><input type=hidden
name=uid value=".$_GET['uid']."></td></tr>";
echo "<tr><td colspan=2 align=center><input type=submit
name=submit value=Insert></td></tr>";
echo "</table>";
echo "</form>";
echo "</center>";
}
// all done? clean up
ldap_close($ldapconn);
}
?>
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Replace_action.php
<?php
set_time_limit(30);
error_reporting(E_ALL);
ini_set('error_reporting', E_ALL);
ini_set('display_errors',1);
// config
$ldapserver = '192.168.1.124';
$ldaptree
= "dc=ubuntuldap2";
// connect
$ldapconn = ldap_connect($ldapserver) or die("Could not connect to LDAP
server.");
ldap_set_option($ldapconn, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 3);
ldap_set_option(NULL, LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL, 7);
ldap_set_option($ldapconn, LDAP_OPT_REFERRALS, 0);
if($ldapconn) {
// binding to ldap server
$ldapbind = ldap_bind($ldapconn, "cn=admin,dc=ubuntuldap2", "admin")
or die ("Please enter valid login credentials. <a
href='javascript:history.back()'>Back </a>");
// verify binding
if ($ldapbind) {
$oc = $_POST['objectclass'];
$uid = $_POST['uid'];
$dn = $_POST['dn'];
$oc = $_POST['objectclass'];
$replaceobj = $_POST['replaceobj'];
$replace = $_POST['replace'];
$attr["$replaceobj"] = $replace;
$result = ldap_mod_replace($ldapconn,$dn, $attr);
if (TRUE === $result) {
echo "Entry was replaced.";
}
else {
echo "Entry cannot be replaced.";
}
}
// all done? clean up
ldap_close($ldapconn);
}
?>
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